When the State becomes the prize 

By Dr Shame Mugova 

In an ordinary democracy, political parties compete for a temporary opportunity to govern. Elections determine who receives a mandate to implement particular policies, subject to the Constitution, Parliament, the courts and public scrutiny. 

But politics changes character when control of the State also determines access to wealth. 

Political office may provide influence over public contracts, mining concessions, agricultural land, State-owned enterprises and regulatory decisions. Proximity to power can acquire commercial value, while losing power may mean losing access to an economic network. 

The objective is no longer simply to govern. 

The State itself becomes the prize. 

This does not mean every politician seeks office to become rich or every successful businessperson owes their wealth to political connections. Zimbabwe has genuine entrepreneurs, professionals, farmers and investors who have succeeded through ability and risk-taking. 

The danger arises when political access appears to offer a more reliable path to wealth than innovation or enterprise. Politics then becomes a struggle over who controls the gateways to national opportunity. 

When access becomes more valuable than ability 

Government awards contracts, issues licences, regulates markets, distributes land and grants rights to exploit natural resources. 

The question is whether these decisions follow transparent rules or personal and political discretion. Where procedures are open and independently reviewed, public authority can support development. Where scrutiny is weak, knowing the right person may become more valuable than developing the right product. 

Economists use the term “rent” to describe income obtained through privileged control of a scarce opportunity rather than by creating new value. In a rent-based economy, success may depend less on productivity than on access to decision-makers. 

This is the deeper meaning of the political expression: “It is our turn to eat.” 

The phrase contains an entire theory of government. Political victory is imagined not as an opportunity to serve, but as permission to feed. One group gains access to the table while everyone else waits outside. 

Losing power may then threaten not only political careers but also contracts, licences and accumulated privilege. This creates powerful incentives to retain control. 

A mineral can be extracted only once 

This problem is especially important in mining. In April 2026, gold and platinum-group metals alone accounted for 77 per cent of Zimbabwe’s merchandise exports. Other mineral products increased that dependence further. 

Yet minerals are not created by a government or political party. They are finite national assets. Once extracted and exported, they cannot be replaced. 

The State must therefore manage them as a trustee for citizens living today and Zimbabweans who have not yet been born. 

The Constitution supports this responsibility. Section 73 requires natural resources to be used sustainably and the environment protected for present and future generations. Section 298 requires the burdens and benefits of resource use to be shared equitably between generations. 

This creates a simple test for every major mining project: 

When the mineral has left the country, what durable asset will remain? 

It might be infrastructure, national savings, locally owned industries, technological capabilities or workers with transferable skills. 

Employment, investment and tax revenue matter, but they do not fully measure mineral benefit. A proper assessment must also consider local procurement, debt service, fiscal concessions, profit repatriation, environmental obligations and permanent resource depletion. 

A billion-dollar investment announcement is not the same thing as a billion dollars accruing to the Zimbabwean public. The figure tells us what a project may cost, not what the country will ultimately gain. 

The public cannot scrutinise a deal it cannot see 

Transparency in mineral concessions is not merely a civil-society preference. Section 315 of the Constitution requires contracts involving mineral rights to be negotiated and performed transparently, honestly, cost-effectively and competitively. 

Citizens should be able to establish how a concession was awarded, who ultimately owns the company, what fiscal terms apply, what interest the State holds and what environmental and community obligations were accepted. 

The recent Karo Platinum agreement illustrates the difference between announcing an investment and disclosing its complete national return. 

The project received a 25-year Special Mining Lease covering 23,903 hectares. More than US$240 million has reportedly been invested. Its first phase is expected to employ more than 1,000 people and produce approximately 226,000 ounces of platinum-group metals annually. The Government holds a 15 per cent free-carried interest through Generation Minerals. 

These are important facts. But calculating the public return also requires the full fiscal framework, the value of the State’s interest, project-specific concessions, local procurement commitments, community obligations and provision for environmental rehabilitation. 

Karo may ultimately prove highly beneficial to Zimbabwe. Asking these questions does not prejudge it. It demonstrates the difference between announcing an investment and publishing enough information for citizens to determine what the country will receive. 

Zimbabwean law requires companies to identify and register their beneficial owners. The harder question is whether that information is complete, current and accessible enough for citizens to connect mineral rights to the people who ultimately benefit. 

Zimbabwe also indicated in 2019 that it was considering joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Seven years later, it is not among its implementing countries. Membership would not solve every problem, but it would require more systematic disclosure of licences, contracts, ownership, production and payments. 

Secrecy may make an agreement easier to conclude. It rarely makes it easier to trust. 

The mineral leaves, but poverty remains 

A country can record growing mineral exports while communities surrounding its mines remain poor. Trucks carrying valuable minerals may pass through settlements without reliable electricity, clean water, functioning clinics, properly equipped schools or adequate roads. 

These communities may experience displacement, dust, pressure on water supplies and long-term environmental risk while much of the financial benefit flows elsewhere. 

Zimbabwe has experimented with Community Share Ownership Trusts, corporate social-responsibility projects and project-specific commitments. What remains unclear is a consistent national rule determining what proportion of mineral benefit should remain in communities bearing the immediate costs of extraction. 

A classroom block handed over at a ceremony does not, by itself, demonstrate that a community has received a fair return from decades of mining. 

Value addition can improve the equation. The Manhize steel plant goes beyond exporting iron ore by creating domestic production capacity and opportunities for downstream manufacturing. 

The danger is that mineral exports become a substitute for development rather than its foundation. The country celebrates export receipts but continues importing machinery and manufactured goods and develops few domestic supply chains. 

The mineral leaves. The headline remains. The underlying economy changes very little. 

Wealth protects power, and power protects wealth 

Political access can produce economic privilege. Economic privilege can then help preserve political access. 

Businesses whose success depends on government decisions have an interest in political continuity. Those benefiting from contracts, licences or regulatory protection may fear that a change of administration will threaten their position. 

Political leaders, in turn, may benefit from the resources and influence of groups whose fortunes are connected to the existing system. 

This relationship does not always require an explicit agreement. The incentives may be enough. A businessperson dependent on State favour understands the risks of political change. A politician supported by economically dependent elites understands the value of protecting their privileges. 

Wealth protects power, and power protects wealth. 

This is why mining transparency, public procurement, political finance, constitutional design and the duration of political terms should not always be treated as separate subjects. They can be connected by the economic value attached to controlling the State. 

Zimbabwe’s recent decision to lengthen political terms must therefore be examined not only as a constitutional question, but within the country’s political economy. 

This does not prove that everyone who supported extended terms was protecting an economic interest. It means constitutional changes cannot be understood entirely separately from a system in which political control may influence access to wealth. 

For an ordinary entrepreneur, the lesson is discouraging: the shortest route to success may appear to be not developing a better product, but cultivating a powerful patron. 

An economy governed by that lesson will struggle to innovate. 

Political office must not become a title deed to the country 

The answer is not to reject foreign investment or treat every relationship between business and the State as suspicious. Zimbabwe needs investment, productive businesses, industrialists and entrepreneurs. 

The answer is to ensure that wealth is created within institutions that are open, competitive and accountable. 

Mining agreements should be publicly defensible. Beneficial owners should be identifiable. Conflicts of interest and political finance should be disclosed. Communities should receive predictable benefits. Environmental obligations should be monitored, and mineral revenues should finance assets that benefit citizens after the minerals are gone. 

When losing an election means losing only the temporary authority to govern, power can alternate peacefully. When losing office threatens an entire structure of wealth, contracts and privilege, surrendering power becomes more difficult. 

Zimbabwe’s political and economic challenges are therefore inseparable. The country will struggle to resolve its political contestation while control of the State remains one of its most valuable economic assets. 

Political office should be a temporary public responsibility, not a title deed to the country. 

The State belongs neither to the governing party nor to the people currently occupying its offices. Its institutions, land and natural resources are held in trust for every citizen. 

Including the citizen who has not yet been born. 

Dr Shame Mugova is a Lecturer in Finance at Birmingham City University. He writes on finance, economic policy, governance and development, with a particular interest in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa. He writes in his personal capacity.