By Khanyisani Silwane Ncube
For forty days, the biblical giant Goliath relentlessly provoked and taunted God’s people, the Israelites. A feared Philistine warrior, he was heavily armed from head to toe with the finest armour of his time. Morning and evening, he stepped forward to challenge Israel, striking fear into the hearts of its trusted soldiers.
Then came David, a young shepherd with neither military experience nor impressive weaponry. To many, he appeared hopelessly outmatched. Yet despite overwhelming odds, David refused to be intimidated. Armed only with faith, courage, a sling, and five smooth stones, he confronted the giant. With one precise strike, Goliath tumbled down, bringing an end to Israel’s humiliation and ushering in a moment of great celebration and deliverance.
For many Zimbabweans, the David and Goliath narrative has become a powerful metaphor for their own political journey since independence from British rule in 1980.
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For over four decades, Zimbabwe has been governed under ZANU-PF’s dominant political grip. Critics have long accused the party of provoking and intimidating the very citizens it governs. Soon after independence in 1980, hopes for a democratic future were overshadowed by political violence. The Gukurahundi military campaign of the 1980s left deep national scars, with thousands of civilians killed in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands, according to the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and other human rights bodies that documented the atrocities. The Unity Accord of 1987 absorbed PF-ZAPU into ZANU-PF, removing the main opposition party and moving Zimbabwe close to a de facto one-party state.
That dominance was not absolute for long. Other political parties, including some ZANU-PF offshoots, still emerged, among them ZUM, ZANU-Ndonga, the MDC, and eventually the CCC. As challengers multiplied, ZANU-PF faced growing allegations from opposition parties and human rights organisations of heavy-handed tactics against its opponents, including arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and politically motivated prosecutions.
To many observers, the turn of the millennium in 2000 marked a sharp escalation in the tactics used to retain power. Critics and civil society groups widely allege that the ruling party has effectively captured state institutions and used them against political opponents, a characterisation ZANU-PF rejects. In 2008, Zimbabweans voted in large numbers, but the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission withheld the presidential results for more than a month. When the results were finally announced, the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai had polled ahead of ZANU-PF’s Robert Mugabe, but a runoff was declared on the basis that neither candidate had reached the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright. In the run-up to that runoff, hundreds of people, most of them opposition supporters, were killed in violence that human rights organisations attributed largely to state-aligned forces. Tsvangirai, who had himself been arrested on several occasions, withdrew from the race and left for Botswana, citing the violence against his supporters.
The 2008 stalemate led to a government of national unity involving the MDC formations and ZANU-PF from 2009 to 2013. Many analysts remain convinced that Tsvangirai won the 2008 election outright and that ZANU-PF retained power through institutions the opposition regarded as compromised, including the electoral body and the security services. Senior military figures were reported, in 2008 and earlier, to have said they would not accept a Tsvangirai presidency on the grounds that he lacked liberation-war credentials.
That coalition government brought a period of relative economic and political stabilisation. The runaway inflation, unemployment, and poverty that had driven millions of Zimbabweans abroad in search of a living eased considerably, and many returned home to better prospects. The optimism proved short-lived. Following the 2013 elections, which ZANU-PF won amid opposition claims of irregularities, Zimbabwe’s economic decline resumed. Rising unemployment, inflation, and deteriorating public services drove millions more Zimbabweans to seek opportunities abroad, particularly in South Africa, where many have faced recurring waves of xenophobic violence.
The political landscape shifted again in 2017, when Emmerson Mnangagwa, who had come to power after the military intervention that removed Robert Mugabe, took office. He promised a “brighter tomorrow” and a commitment to constitutional democracy. For many Zimbabweans, those expectations have faded, and a significant body of opinion now regards his rule as more repressive than Mugabe’s. In August 2018, soldiers were deployed against people protesting delayed election results, and six were shot dead, deaths that a commission of inquiry chaired by former South African president Kgalema Motlanthe later attributed to the actions of the army and police. Numerous other gatherings, though described by organisers as peaceful, have been broken up by police. The government has made clear that it will not permit protests it regards as a threat to the state, notwithstanding that freedom of assembly and demonstration is protected under section 59 of Zimbabwe’s constitution.
Under Mugabe, opposition and civil society were at times able to mount protests and court challenges to check the government. Critics argue that the current administration tends to treat protest against it as an attempt to unseat the government by unlawful means, and has directed those with grievances to the courts. Rights groups say the police have repeatedly banned or dispersed peaceful protests in breach of the constitution, and the courts, like other institutions, are widely perceived by government critics as sympathetic to ZANU-PF. In a widely circulated 2019 video, Mnangagwa is reported to have told supporters that the ruling party controlled the army, air force and police, remarks that critics said confirmed long-standing concerns about institutional capture. The state broadcaster has also been widely criticised for favouring ZANU-PF and marginalising opposition voices.
Since Mnangagwa took office, some political observers have argued that he intended to weaken the main opposition and pave the way for constitutional changes to extend his stay in power. After both the 2018 and 2023 elections, the opposition accused ZANU-PF of engineering the fracturing of the main opposition parties, the MDC Alliance and the CCC respectively, both led by Nelson Chamisa. On both occasions Chamisa polled over 44% of the presidential vote. Crucially, in 2023 the CCC denied ZANU-PF the two-thirds parliamentary majority needed to amend the constitution. Soon after Parliament convened, Sengezo Tshabangu, who described himself as the CCC’s interim secretary-general, a claim Chamisa and much of the party rejected, issued recall notices for more than 30 CCC legislators. Many in the opposition accused him of acting to ZANU-PF’s benefit, an accusation that remains contested. In the by-elections that followed, ZANU-PF won most of the vacated seats, restoring the two-thirds majority it had fallen short of in 2023.
For a long time, Mnangagwa publicly rejected suggestions that he intended to amend the constitution to prolong his tenure. He insisted he was a constitutionalist and a two-term president who would leave office in 2028 when his second five-year term ended. State media ran ZANU-PF’s denials that it planned to amend the constitution or that Tshabangu’s recalls were designed to reverse the loss of its two-thirds majority. In July 2024, Mnangagwa’s lawyers demanded that NewsDay retract and apologise for an article, headed “ED has no intention of stepping down”, that quoted analysts warning he might overstay; the paper complied and retracted it. At the same time, Mnangagwa did not publicly rebuke allies, and later ordinary ZANU-PF members, who began calling for his term to be extended. At the party’s 2024 and 2025 annual conferences, ZANU-PF resolved that his term should run beyond 2028. In a media briefing in February 2025, he said he would “persuade the persuaders not to persuade me” to stay beyond 2028.
For his critics, that record fits the expression “he indicates right, but turns left”. In July 2026, Mnangagwa signed into law the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Act, assenting to it on 7 July. Among its provisions, the Act extends the presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years, ends the direct election of the president in favour of selection by Parliament, and postpones the next general elections to 2030, keeping Mnangagwa in office two years beyond the limit set by the 2013 constitution. The Bill’s passage was accompanied by reported violence and intimidation directed at prominent opponents of the amendment: the Law Society of Zimbabwe and rights groups reported that constitutional-law professor Lovemore Madhuku and human rights lawyer Douglas Coltart were assaulted or harassed, and former finance minister and lawyer Tendai Biti was arrested in Mutare in March 2026 in connection with his opposition to the Bill. The government declined to put the amendments to a national referendum, as many had urged. Explaining his approval, Mnangagwa said he had felt legislators had “done the correct thing” and that he was happy they had passed it. Many observers argue that, in assenting to the amendment after years of denials, he confirmed the fears of those who had long warned he would extend his rule.
Against that background, many Zimbabweans feel caught between a rock and a hard place. The democratic space in which to challenge ZANU-PF has narrowed considerably under Mnangagwa and, critics say, continues to shrink.
Beyond Zimbabwe’s borders, regional responses have disappointed many citizens. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union have been criticised for what many see as muted engagement with Zimbabwe’s governance problems. South Africa, the region’s largest economy and home to millions of Zimbabwean migrants, has drawn particular criticism. Since the “quiet diplomacy” of the Thabo Mbeki era, South Africa has been widely accused of shielding ZANU-PF diplomatically, even as it struggles to manage the migration driven by Zimbabwe’s economic decline. Critics also point to a contrast: South Africa has taken a leading role at the International Court of Justice in a case alleging genocide against Palestinians, thousands of kilometres away, while remaining far more muted about alleged human rights abuses on its own doorstep. Many Zimbabwean migrants are now caught up in xenophobic violence in South Africa, leaving some homeless or pushed back toward the country they fled. During the recent tensions, ZANU-PF spokesperson Christopher Mutsvangwa told South African broadcaster Newzroom Afrika that Zimbabwe’s economy was “doing very well” and could absorb returning citizens, remarks that critics condemned as dismissive of the danger facing Zimbabweans and out of step with conditions at home.
Zimbabweans today find themselves at a critical crossroads. The democratic space has narrowed considerably, and many of the traditional avenues for seeking political change are widely perceived as ineffective or inaccessible. As institutions lose public confidence and regional responses remain limited, many citizens feel increasingly isolated in their search for accountability and democratic renewal.
The biblical account of David is ultimately not a story about physical strength. It is a story about courage in the face of overwhelming odds. David did not prevail because he possessed greater power than Goliath. He prevailed because he was willing to confront what others believed could never be defeated.
The question that now confronts Zimbabwe is not merely who will stand up, but whether someone, or a movement, will rise with the wisdom, integrity, and determination to lead the nation toward a more democratic, peaceful, and prosperous future.
By Khanyisani Silwane Ncube Practising civil rights attorney in South Africa, with an LLM in Transnational Legal Practice completed in the US (2022) Email: okasilwane@gmail.com
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