ZPRA jailed in Mozambique and Botswana during ZIPA Debacle 1975/76

By Irvine Sibhona

This article aims to shed light on the problems surrounding the failed Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) experiment, which was intended to unify the two liberation forces: ZAPU’s ZPRA and ZANU’s ZANLA.

ZIPA was meant to suspend political divisions between the two liberation movements and to create a joint force that would prosecute the liberation war more effectively.

Not only would a unified, well-coordinated military strategy have reduced duplication and improved operational effectiveness, but the combined forces would also have formed a larger, more formidable army, one capable of attracting greater support from allied organisations like the OAU and regional movements such as FRELIMO and MK.

Sadly, rather than fostering unity, the ZIPA led to traumatic outcomes, including the imprisonment of ZPRA cadres in both Mozambique and Botswana.

From the outset, ZIPA was a doomed project. While it was clearly dead from its inception, ZANLA leaders believed that with the creation of the super organisation, they had stumbled on a glorious opportunity to finish off ZPRA and by proxy, ZAPU. To them, ZIPA was a gift from God, like the Biblical manna, this time a chance to finally dismantle ZPRA as a military wing of ZAPU.

What they underestimated was the strategic intelligence of ZPRA leadership. ZANLA commanders assumed they could simply intimidate and dominate their counterparts into submission. They moved from camp to camp, issuing chilling orders to their fighters: eliminate the “Machuwachuwa” – a derogatory term for ZPRA cadres – before even confronting the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF).

Intimidation of ZPRA cadres

When ZPRA fighters arrived at the training camps in Mozambique, facilities that had already been allocated to ZANLA by FRELIMO, fresh off their independence victory on 25 June 1975, the atmosphere was anything but welcoming. Although ZANLA commanders had been briefed on the planned unification under ZIPA, they quietly told their fighters that ZPRA was finished. It was a deliberate move, clearly meant to undermine the unity process before it even began.

The reception was openly hostile. ZPRA guerrillas were met not with camaraderie, but with intimidation and tactics designed to demoralise. Derisive slogans and chants echoed through the camps: “Down with Dumbu-Guru!”, a mocking reference to Joshua Nkomo’s size, and “Pasi na Nkomo!” (“Down with Nkomo”) among others, all aimed at humiliating ZPRA fighters and their leadership.

Nkomo became the primary target of a calculated propaganda campaign launched by ZANU and its military wing, ZANLA, aimed at discrediting both him and the broader ZAPU leadership. At the time, Nkomo was engaged in high-stakes negotiations with Ian Smith’s government back in Rhodesia, where he remained based. ZANLA seized on this as an opportunity to paint him as a sell-out, an accusation that resonated deeply within their ranks and further eroded trust in ZAPU. The narrative took hold quickly within their movement. ZANLA commanders began to see themselves as the true kingmakers of the liberation struggle, convinced they were steering the ZIPA project and holding the reins of revolutionary legitimacy.

The key difference, however, was that ZPRA cadres were professionally trained soldiers, many of whom had already seen combat against the Rhodesian forces. This front-line experience gave them a clear sense of military discipline and tactical awareness, which made ZANLA’s behaviour stand out sharply in contrast.

In addition, some ZPRA fighters had undergone intensive training for up to a year and a half, under the guidance of regular army officers from Ghana, who instilled the values of discipline, structure, administration, and professionalism. In comparison to their ZANLA counterparts therefore, ZPRA was a well-trained, well-organised force, one capable of distinguishing between a properly trained soldier and a civilian with a weapon. 

The overall behaviour and decisions of some ZANLA commanders were certainly a source of apprehension for some of our fighters, who became concerned about what was going on. Poor planning and perhaps ineptitude and neglect of duties by these commanders resulted in many of our soldiers going hungry or literally starving.

Admittedly, there was not enough food in the camps, but poor logistics such as regular, consistent meal times made the situation worse. Sometimes meal times were changed deliberately. When the food was finally served, the portions also tended to be tiny, in the extreme cases just a cup of few grains of corn.

At the same time, cadres were constantly subjected to humiliating intimidation at the hands of ZANLA commanders, the most common of which was being threatened with flogging at the open parade, in front of thousands of freshly recruited civilians, who gleefully watched these spectacles. This humiliation was a regular occurrence whenever fighters failed to follow ZANLA’s controversial commands, such as refusing to chant praises of ZANU, or to denigrate ZAPU and ZPRA leadership.

ZPRA cadres could not be seen condemning their own leaders during parade. They also couldn’t follow controversial commands, especially when their commanders hadn’t issued such directives, and hadn’t even appeared at the camp. It felt as though ZIPA was a trap laid for ZPRA cadres, including their commanders. Soon, more troubling incidents followed: ZPRA fighters began disappearing from the camp. Their ZPRAs commanders would be informed that the missing comrades had been deployed for operations the night before.

Then came disturbing reports that ZANLA cadres were forcing ZPRA fighters into pit latrines filled with human waste. Fear gripped the ZPRA ranks; being out of sight, even briefly, could mean vanishing without a trace. The situation became so bad that many of our fighters could not visit latrines to relieve themselves unless escorted by ZPRA comrades. ZANLA had turned toilets into death traps.

Another cruel strategy ZANLA especially when it faced resistance in attempting to apprehend ZPRA comrades was to enlist the help of FRELIMO, who would commit our cadres into their prisons. In cases where large numbers of ZPRA cadres were earmarked for punishment, FRELIMO would incarcerate them in their camps or in some areas where there would no access to weapons and food. It made little difference whether one was under FRELIMO or under ZANLA, similarly cruel and dehumanising treatment was meted out.