A legacy of resilience: Jack Mpofu on overcoming challenges in the fight for independence
The excerpts of an interview with former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) High Command member and pioneer liberation fighter, Makhethi Ndebele, commonly known by his norm de guerre Jack Mpofu.
Mpofu died at his Cowdray Park home on Saturday. He was 82.
Can you tell us where you were born and in which year?
I was born in the Tshitshi area of Plumtree in 1942. I did my education there, from Sub A up to Standard 3. After that, I went to Mbakwe Mission where I completed Standard 4 up to Standard 6.
So when did you start participating in the politics of the struggle?
Maybe let me start by saying that when I left school, I joined the agricultural extension workers. We moved around demarcating fields to prevent soil erosion. I worked with Luke Maceba’s brother and Moses Lusinga for some time. After that, we were looking for money and often played cards. One day, I played and lost. My uncle told my grandparents that I lost money playing cards, and they cursed me, saying, “You will die poor.” I cried the whole night.
In the morning, I told my cousin to get ropes so we could milk cows. After he gave me the ropes and containers, I went into the kitchen, turned a pounding pot upside down, put a stool on top, climbed up, and attempted to commit suicide with a rope. When they heard the noise, they came and cut the rope, but I had already soiled myself. If they had delayed, I might have died. After that, I asked them for money to go to South Africa. They sold a cow and gave me the money. Some people believed confessing sins, such as sleeping with someone’s wife, would get you assistance, but if you died, it was up to you. My neck was swollen. Once it healed, I went to South Africa with some others. The place was cold, and I couldn’t carry my suitcase, so someone helped. I got a job at a place called Tsotsi where they kept chickens. The white owner bought a helicopter from selling chickens.
What I learned is that in business, whether with tomatoes or chickens, you must always have products available for customers. Unlike Africans who boast about having 4000 chickens but run out, we made sure to hide chickens in a pile of insides so even the manager wouldn’t check. We ended up selling some to locals. Later, I joined a man named Dladla and went to Kimberley seeking employment. We dug a pit for fire outside town, washed our faces in town, and looked for jobs. Police saw us and told us to go back, saying we would be arrested for looking like school children. We moved to Kuruman where we mined manganese and found work. Eventually, I returned home, realizing it was better to work here.
I tried joining the army at Brad Barracks but was too short. Then I got a piece job on Main Street near where Joshua Nkomo’s statue is now. I met a Shona guy named Ngozi. We stayed together in Tshabalala, and ZAPU activities were already there. During an uprising, a black person slapped me on the face and rode away, leaving me crying.
After some time, Thamu Kadamu said he was going to Zambia, having been dismissed from work. Ngozi said we should go together. We left and reached Victoria Falls. Others crossed the border while I stayed behind. They told me to follow and meet them at a specific place. I crossed the Zambezi Bridge without issues and went to Livingstone, where I found them. I was employed and trained to use a roller for road construction. In Zambia, I stayed in high-density suburbs where ZAPU was strong, led by an old man named Desire Khuphe.
In 1967, ZAPU needed 200 volunteers to fight for independence, but finding them was a challenge. We went into Lusaka, capturing people by force to get the required number. We then traveled to Tanzania, to a camp near Morogoro. The camp commander was Albert Nxele, with Ambrose Mutinhiri as Chief of Staff. Instructors included Mangena, Munyanyi, Toyitoyi, Lukeout Masuku, and Sam Mfakazi. I was in a company led by Alfred Nikitha Mangena, with deputies Elliot Masengu and Jordan Gampu. Training was harsh and lasted 9 months.
Upon completing training, we returned to Lusaka. The camp had Umkhonto weSizwe and ZIPRA cadres. In 1967, they crossed into Wankie. I continued reconnaissance along Zambezi, scouting crossing points. The whites were still relaxed but shaken by the Wankie battles. After a split in ZAPU, we continued with the struggle. Chikerema’s group wanted to take over but failed and were arrested. We stayed at Mboroma camp, negotiating with the Zambian government, led by Mthimkhulu, Mazula, and others. Those wanting to stay with Jason Moyo in ZAPU remained.
ZIPRA’s commander was initially Akim Ndlovu, followed by JD under operations. During operations, I worked on sabotage missions like the Victoria Falls train attack. We used explosives to destroy the train, causing Smith to close the border.
I first met Nikita Mangena in Morogoro. He was already a commander, having trained at the Algerian academy. After more training in the Soviet Union, I became an instructor at Morogoro. Tensions with ZANLA led to conflicts and deaths, halting joint operations. We then trained at Mwembeshi, under Sigoge initially and later myself.
During this time, Mangena was injured in an ambush and later died. His leadership was both respected and misunderstood, causing internal conflicts. I was shot in an ambush and treated in Czechoslovakia. Mangena’s death impacted the camp differently, with reactions varying from grief to indifference.
What is the name of this camp? Is it Nkomo?
I can’t remember the name; maybe that’s it. They are the people who crossed in 1967. The people who were there included Dabengwa, Tambo, and Joe because it was a joint operation between ZAPU and Umkhonto. They crossed the Zambezi near Victoria Falls. They entered and met whites at the game reserve. Some of those sent for reconnaissance got lost and moved further into the country. That’s something; it’s part of the struggle, the things that I witnessed.
When we arrived from Tanzania, we stayed with Umkhonto Wesizwe people. Our leader was James Chikerema, Jason, Edward Ndlovu, and Jane Ngwenya. Chikerema used to visit the camp. When we arrived at that camp, we shared it with Umkhonto Wesizwe. Chikerema allowed people to smoke weed and brew beer at the camp, which some Shona guys did because they loved fun. When people were supposed to cross—not the ANC guys, only our ZAPU guys—Chikerema looked for a traditional healer. That traditional healer performed some rituals, maybe to ensure that those who went in wouldn’t come back. Many people went into the country. The whites were still relaxed, but they were shaken by the Wankie battles.
I was also given people to work with in reconnaissance along the Zambezi, meaning we were looking for crossing points from Livingstone towards Kariba. We would cross to see what was taking place; there was peace. Only whites were moving in boats along the Zambezi, and there was no problem. Others crossed, went for four days, and came back. When they came back, Chikerema started his things, and ZAPU split. Chikerema formed FLORIZI together with George Nyandoro.
We then said, “Can we sit down and talk, maybe we can solve this issue at the camp,” because it looked like we were divided almost on tribal lines: Matabeleland on one side and Mashonaland on the other, although they were few. We tried to talk, but Chikerema said, “I have been carrying Nkomo for a long time. It is time now to drop him. The people of Zimbabwe said I should form a party.” I think he was trying to join with other Shona people in the country. We were saying Nkomo is saying, and Chikerema was saying Nkomo said I should form my party.
During that time, where was Nkomo? Nkomo was detained at Gonakudzingwa. So, when it was like that, we were staying at the same camp. We sent Edward Ndlovu to guard ZAPU property because we feared Chikerema would take and sell the items. We stayed there until Chikerema went back to Lusaka with Jason Moyo. We remained at the camp. One member from our side who also defected was Tshinga Dube. He went with Chikerema; I am not sure about others. I don’t know whether he wanted to be part of FLORIZI. He can tell us better. So, we remained like that.
Then the Chikerema guys killed a Kudu, and that’s when we realized they had guns. We then thought of looking for guns. The Umkhonto Wesizwe guys were staying close to us. They had enough food rations because they would tell Tambo to feed them, saying they never lacked anything in South Africa. “You are sleeping at a hotel under a mosquito net, give us food.” We used to ask for food from them. We then took a gun and killed a buffalo. They thought we had guns. But we separated; there was no problem. They went to look for another camp, and so did we. That’s how we broke away from Chikerema.
As time went on, I think we went back, but we were now few. I was still with my reconnaissance group. We continued working, but we were now few. This was when a group of not more than eight went for training, and this side we were now few. Then in Morogoro, the group of Mazinyane had finished training but had not yet returned. Those problems made us go to Mboromo when the Zambian government was mediating. We had the likes of Mthimkhulu, Mazula, and others. They had captured Jason, perhaps wanting to take over, but they failed and were arrested.
At Mboroma, we were asked, “Those who want to remain in ZAPU with Jason?” Many people went that side. Then Godfrey Malaba, together with Mazula, split and went to London. We remained, and I went back to reconnaissance. While the situation was like that, we were supposed to start the struggle to show our presence. The plan was to hit a place, move, and hit another, only through sabotage. So, there was Matshimini in Livingstone, and I was at Siyambondo. During that time, JD was the commander, commanding soldiers.
This is before the formation of ZIPRA? Yes, this is before ZIPRA. The commander before ZIPRA was Akim Ndlovu. Then JD was the commander under operations. He is the one who entered with the Wankie group. He was with the communist party leader Chris Hani. Chris Hani crossed with them. So, we said we must continue the struggle. There was nothing we could do; we had to use mines and other things. Matshimini came, and Mazinyane was also brought because they had finished their training in Morogoro. When Mazinyane came, we were now three. We were supposed to hit the Victoria Falls train. We got there and did rehearsals on how we were going to do it. We went there and crossed; we were with Munyanyi and others, just a few. But the people who crossed with explosives were Mazinyane, myself, and Matshimini. Matshimini was the commander. We crossed there barefoot because Matshimini liked to walk barefoot, especially when we were at the bases. We didn’t know that he was exercising so that by the time it required walking barefoot, he was ready.
Just after crossing the Falls bridge, we removed our shoes. We thought it was a bridge, yet it was a covert. We picked some stones and started setting up our explosives under the bridge. The entire box of explosives—I don’t know how many Kgs.
The aim was to destroy the bridge? No, to hit the train, not the bridge. Our aim was to destroy the goods train, for that matter. Then we took some of the explosives and put them on the left and right of the railway line to destroy it as well. We joined them together for the train to detonate the explosives once it stepped on the connections. We first waited for the passenger train to pass and then put the explosives targeting the goods train. We went back, and before we got to the river, it had exploded.
When we were by the river, we threw a stone into the gorges. As it went down, it made noise, causing Munyanyi and others to run away. They went as far as Lusaka. When they got there, Jason asked what the issue was. They said, “We think those people have been captured; we heard gunshots.” Jason said, “Go back and bring them dead or alive.” They came back. Now it’s morning; the train has been hit, and we are still there. The whites started bombing from the bridge towards us. The boat was down there; I don’t know how they didn’t see it. When they were bombing, all the animals and snakes were passing through us, and there was nothing we could do. They kept on bombing, and by 4 o’clock, they were almost near to where we were. At 4 o’clock, they stopped bombing.
I took a log and my gun, got into the Zambezi, and started rowing. While in the middle of the river, I lost control of that log and had to swim to the end. I asked Mazinyane to assist me in getting out. He was hesitant. I told him to hold me since I was in the water. He said I shouldn’t point the gun at him. I told him to hold me. I said that’s theory; you can’t say that while I am in the water. We stayed there until it was dark. We saw someone with a torch; luckily, they were our guys. They came and took us back to Livingstone. We got there and started drinking and enjoying ourselves. We were no longer thinking about that mission; it was now for the whites to deal with it. That is when Smith closed the border.
I first met Nikita Mangena in Morogoro at the training camp where I trained. They were a group of instructors who trained at the Algeria Academy. We trained there in 1967. As I mentioned before, Nxele was the camp commander, and Ambrose Mtinhiri was the Chief of Staff. In my platoon, Mangena was the commander.
At that time, Mangena was already a commander. I separated from Mazinyane and Matshimini and did not see them again when I returned to my station at Deka. After some time, I was called to go for training in the Soviet Union under reconnaissance, while Mazinyane trained in intelligence and Thomas Ngwenya in logistics. We finished our training and came back, after which I became an instructor in Morogoro. The camp commander was Sam Mfakazi, or something like that. Duphu was also there, and Maseko was there for a short while. I think Duphu also left, and we continued to train cadres at Morogoro. The Tanzanian government then refused to let those people leave for deployments. We trained in Morogoro until there was an attempt to unite ZANLA and ZIPRA. Mujuru and his crew refused, saying our training was too harsh on soldiers. They refused to unite.
While we were there, we fought over food because the ZANLA people wanted to always be in charge of cooking duties to have an advantage when it came to dishing out food. This led to us shooting at each other, resulting in the loss of three cadres. I can’t count their number, but they were not buried as they were eaten by wild animals. They ran away to town in Morogoro, where they stayed with soldiers.
What was the name of the camp?
Morogoro training camp. While they were there, Akim Ndlovu came. I was also present, but I can’t remember the other members who tried to solve this problem, but it failed. This is why they left for Mozambique, and we also left. The Tanzanian government stopped our people from going to the operations. We then tried to move them in small numbers until they all came to Zambia. After that, I didn’t continue as an instructor there. Instead, we started training people at Mwembeshi. Initially, the camp commander was Sigoge, but I took over when he went to HQ. I remained there, and the whites had started to bomb here and there. Our members even discovered drums of fuel in the bush, maybe intended for refueling. They then bombed Mkushi and other places. They tried to bomb our camp, but because I had positioned people strategically, we were able to respond effectively. We all targeted the area from which we heard gunfire. That’s where Green Leader fell, and we took the wings of that plane and gave them to Nkomo, who was supposed to tell the world about it. I was then called to HQ, where I became the deputy chief of personnel and training. This was during Mangena’s time. There was Tshangana, Duphu, and Sigoge.
How was it working with Mangena?
Mangena had no problem as long as his staff did what was supposed to be done. However, there was sometimes a problem because others didn’t understand him among the cadres and the civilian leadership. Eventually, they shot him.
You are saying some people did not understand him. What made them not understand him?
They were saying Mangena was too powerful and would take over from Nkomo, but there was nothing like that. There were so many Selous Scouts sent by the whites. That is when Mangena was shot and lost his finger and was also shot in the thigh.
As a commander, didn’t Mangena have bodyguards?
I was not there at that time, but he had bodyguards. When I was called to HQ, I went out for drinks. They looked for me, saying there were people who had been ambushed by the whites. I went back and joined Tshangana.
So who were shot here?
This was a group that had trained in Angola. They were going to cross with Asaph, who was their commander. When they went with them, the cars they were using were carrying petrol, I think three or so. Along the way, Donki told them not to cross there, advising them to leave the cars and walk because there were mines. Asaph refused. When they were close to the gorges, Donki said the cars should move close together. He was sitting on the bonnet when they stepped on a mine. The whites, who were deployed around that area, shot them, and around 30 people died. Mangena wanted to go and bury them himself. We left with Mangena, Tshangana, Sigoge, myself, and Gedi Ndlovu using cars. When we got there, Donki said cars should not pass, but Mangena resisted. We moved forward a bit and parked. Gedi was tasked to guard the cars with some other guys. We then continued on foot and found that the cadres were in pieces. Asaph was just a small piece. We dug two graves near the river, took their guns away, and buried them. We went back at night. I said to Mangena, if we go back this same way, maybe the whites saw us and will ambush us. He ignored me, and we used that same road. He took some rest, and after that, we continued walking. When he rested for the second time, he called a car to come and pick him up, and it came. That car had one wheel moving at the center of the road and the other just outside of the road. Even if there was a stone, you were not supposed to move away from it. The driver drove like that. When he arrived, Mangena said, “Come, let’s go.” The first person to get in was Tshangana. When Mangena came, Tshangana said, “Come and sit this side, Commander.” He said, “No, sit there.” Then Sigoge entered along with Mangena’s bodyguards. Donki and I refused to get in. They didn’t even travel a long distance before they were hit. I am sure the driver forgot the driving strategy. Our group panicked and started shooting randomly. I then heard Mangena calling, saying, “Come and help us; we have been injured, and people were deployed on both sides of the road.” So Donki and I went there and found others already dead.
So how serious were Mangena’s injuries?
He was injured on the arm and head, but I didn’t really examine him. I had to look for people to take them to a nearby clinic. I took guys with small guns, and they went. By then, Mangena and Sigoge had been taken. His bodyguards were dead; one of them, Pressman, died on the scene. As I was taking the guns, I was shot. I then told Donki that I had been shot.
So who shot you?
The ZIPRA guys.
Didn’t they see you?
I don’t know their intention.
So if someone says those people who shot you are the ones who put the landmine…
No one had a way of getting that landmine. It was only accessible to people who were coming to use it from that side. But from this side, it was only with logistics or nothing else.
When I was shot, I called Donki and told him I had been shot.
So you didn’t see the person who shot you?
No, it was dark before dawn. They went with Mangena and took me. I had my gun and pouch and was placed near the road. Donki said not to worry; they would come for me. They brought a stretcher bed after leaving Mangena. By that time, I was crawling, unable to walk, and was very tired. Then in the morning, we heard helicopters. I told them to hide me in some scrub because we were in an open place. I thought it was my end if they came here, but I would try something. Luckily, they came and took me to the clinic. When I got there, I found Tshangana crying, saying, “The Commander is late.” I told the driver to put him in the car. We left that clinic and went to a hospital, I think in Tshomo, where they gave me blood. In the morning, we were taken in a helicopter to town in Zambia, where I looked for Dabengwa and MaDube. From there, Mangena was declared dead, and I was in the hospital. I then went to Czechoslovakia, where I was treated and came back on crutches.
Mangena dies. How did people at the camp receive the news of his death?
Well, as with any person, some love you, and some don’t. Some reactionaries and cowards don’t want to fight. All kinds of people. Obviously, within the camps, the majority loved him, but some said Mangena was selling out.
You mentioned that some people said Mangena was selling out, and others said he was cruel. What had he done?
No, you see, in the struggle, some were forced to join and some who went there voluntarily. When they got there, they discovered that things were not as they had thought, and there was the constant threat of death because no one wants to die. If you are not ready, anyone who orders you to cross the front lines might be seen as a sellout because he is staying behind. Maybe they wanted him to cross with them, but that was not possible. This is what led to the talk that Mangena was a sellout. As for cruelty, people were given hard training so they would be able to withstand whatever situation they faced at the front.
In your view, do you think Mangena was a threat to the civilian leadership? Was he power-hungry?
No, there is nothing like that. Within ZAPU, we didn’t have the threat of soldiers wanting power like in ZANLA. Chitepo and his company, and Jason Moyo, wanted to take over like Samora Machel. The ZANLA guys accepted that proposal, but we rejected it and said the leader would be chosen by the people back home. Otherwise, the spirit of saying “I want to take over” was nonsensical. There was no money, there was nothing to gain. These were just hallucinations. But it didn’t take long before we had to find someone to take over Mangena’s position. Ambrose Mtinhiri was suggested, but there was a concern that he was seen a lot at the American Embassy. That’s what cost him the position, whether it was propaganda or not, so he was not made the commander. He was not that strong anyway. Maybe he was detained at Gonakudzingwa, I don’t know.
There was military intelligence with Mazinyane. After Mangena’s death, they started NSO. Where did the military intelligence go after the death of Nikita?
The military intelligence was led by Buche. Before, when Akim was the commander, Nkiwane was the Chief of Personnel and Training, among others. Remember, I was now injured, so I don’t know what happened after that. The only person I can remember is Buche; he died. Then there was Sam Madondo. I am not sure if he died; he was with Mazinyane.
44 years after the death of Nikita, had he not died, do you think ZIPRA would have been different?
That is 50-50 because most of the people who were in ZIPRA belonged to two hostile camps. Some followed the Eastern ideology, while others followed the Western ideology, essentially the capitalist and the communist/socialist. We were following socialism because Jason Moyo emphasized the importance of not spending a single day without a worker. It was almost a mass organization, the people who were coming in. The initial cadres came voluntarily and were taken for training in different schools. But when these others came, they said they wanted to liberate Zimbabwe. How could they liberate it without any direction? And this is where we are today because people abandoned the revolution.