A former legislator has approached the Constitutional Court seeking to block key clauses in the newly gazetted Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Bill, 2026, arguing that provisions extending presidential and parliamentary terms violate the Constitution’s amendment procedures and are “constitutionally incompetent.”
Prince Dubeko Sibanda, who served as Binga North Member of Parliament after winning the 2013, 2018 and 2023 general elections before his recall later that year, has filed an application citing Parliament as the respondent.
He is challenging clauses that seek to extend the tenure of current office holders despite constitutional prohibitions.
This comes after the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 3) Bill, 2026 was gazetted on February 16, formally starting a 90-day public consultation process that will culminate in a vote by Members of Parliament and Senators.
The bill proposes sweeping changes to Zimbabwe’s constitutional architecture, including extending presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years, replacing direct presidential elections with a parliamentary vote, dissolving the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and restructuring several independent commissions.
With Zanu PF holding a two-thirds majority in Parliament, the bill may pass if the ruling party MPs support it.
In his court papers, Sibanda says he is challenging Parliament’s decision to publish and process the Constitutional Amendment Bill. He argues that some parts of the Bill are not allowed because they try to get around the Constitution’s limits on how it can be changed.
The application is brought in terms of Section 167(2)(d) of the Constitution as read with Rule 32(1) of the Constitutional Court Rules, 2025.
Dubeko said his central complaint is a constitutional one, noting how Parliament has “failed to comply with, and has acted inconsistently with, binding Constitutional obligations that regulate both the existence and the limits of the power to amend the Constitution.”
Sibanda said he is not asking the court to judge whether the constitutional changes are ‘wise, popular, or politically desirable.’ Instead, he wants the court to decide a purely legal question: whether certain clauses in the Bill are allowed under Section 328 of the Constitution.
He also takes issue with Parliament’s decision to publish and move forward with a bill that is designed to override constitutional limits, including Section 328(7), by extending the terms of current office holders.
“This is not a mere interpretive disagreement. It is an explicit legislative declaration that (Parliament) intends to do what Section 328(7) of the Constitution forbids,” he said.
Sibanda argues that publication of a constitutional amendment bill is “a constitutional act undertaken by a constitutional organ” and therefore constitutes “conduct” falling within the reach of the supremacy clause.
“Where a constitutional organ initiates a constitutional amendment process, it must do so within the Constitution’s confines from the very outset. The duty to uphold the Constitution involves refusing to engage in untenable constitutional actions, especially actions whose textual aim is to neutralise the safeguards that define and constrain Parliament’s own power,” he said.
Sibanda grounds his complaint in the supremacy clause of the Constitution, citing Section 2(1), which declares the Constitution supreme and provides that any “law, practice, custom or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.”
He adds that constitutional obligations are binding upon “all Executive, Legislative and Judicial institutions and agencies of government at every level.”
Section 328, which governs constitutional amendments, is not merely procedural but imposes substantive limitations, Sibanda argues.
Section 328(1) defines a “term-limit provision” as a provision, “which limits the length of time that a person may hold or occupy a public office.”
Section 328(7) imposes a substantive prohibition: an amendment to a term-limit provision that extends the length of time a person may hold public office “does not apply to any person who held or occupied that office (or an equivalent office) at any time before the amendment.”
Sibanda argues that Section 328 allows Parliament to change term limits for the future, however it cannot apply those changes to benefit anyone already in office.
“That prohibition is not rhetorical. It is operative constitutional text, designed to prevent incumbency entrenchment by constitutional manipulation,” he said.
He warned accepting “notwithstanding” clauses that override Section 328(7) would open dangerous possibilities.
“If (Parliament) may declare ‘Notwithstanding Section 328(7),’ then, in principle, it could also declare ‘Notwithstanding Section 328(5)’ and thereby pass an amendment by simple majority, rather than the required two-thirds vote,” Sibanda said.
“Such a possibility illustrates the constitutional absurdity and systemic danger of tolerating ‘notwithstanding’ overrides of Section 328.”
Sibanda argues that the rules setting the President’s term and Parliament’s lifespan are clearly “provisions that limit how long persons may occupy those public offices.”
Therefore, he says, they are term-limit provisions under Section 328.
Sibanda identifies Clause 4 and Clause 9 of the new Amendment Bill as constitutionally offensive.
“…The constitutional vice lies not in abstract debate about what future term length might be permissible. The vice lies in the attempt to apply the extension to incumbency through an explicit textual override of Section 328(7).”
Clause 4(b), Sibanda argued, “is therefore crafted to do the very thing Section 328(7) forbids: it purports to make a term-extension amendment apply to a person who held office before the amendment, by relabelling that application as ‘continuation in office’ and by declaring an override of the constitutional limitation.”
Similarly, Clause 9 seeks to amend Section 143 regarding Parliament’s duration, substituting a “seven-year term” for a “five-year term” and inserting a new subsection.
Sibanda asserted that Parliament is not merely a forum for political contestation but “a constitutional organ bound to act within the Constitution, and to respect the supremacy, integrity, and operative force of constitutional limitations.”
“If (Parliament) publishes a Bill containing clauses that are constitutionally incompetent and untenable or seek the abrogation of the provisions of the Constitution, the damage is not postponed to the day of assent,” he said.
“The damage begins at the moment the constitutional order is placed under a legislative process that is constitutionally misdirected and calculated to subvert constitutional limits.”
The former MP argues that Parliament cannot fulfil its constitutional obligations “by advancing a Bill that declares the Constitution’s limitations irrelevant.”
Sibanda describes the relief he seeks as “surgical” and carefully limited.
“I ask the Court to remove only those clauses that are incompetent and impermissible because they purport to override Section 328(7),” he stated.
“This Court is the guardian of constitutional supremacy. Where (Parliament’s) conduct transgresses the boundaries of the amendment power, this Court’s declaratory jurisdiction is engaged precisely to prevent constitutional illegality from maturing into constitutional crisis.”
In his draft order, Sibanda asks the court to declare that Clauses 4(b) and 9(b) of the Amendment Bill are unconstitutional because they violate Section 328(7).
He also seeks an order stopping Parliament from processing the Bill until Clauses 4(b) and 9(b) are removed.
Sibanda seeks no order as to costs.
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