By Irvine Sibhona aka Barbetone Muzwambira
In the first issue, we explained that it was important for ZAPU to establish a regular army to manage the burgeoning number of forces which resulted from ZPRA’s effective recruitment machinery.
Furthermore, ZAPU was now thinking beyond the war and preparing to run the state. To this end, it was important to establish a regular army to minimise dependence on the Rhodesian establishment at independence (which sadly became the case, because of ZANLA’s lack of similar foresight).
Importantly, there was parallel training in some civilian sectors, which would enable the revolutionary party to hit the ground running in terms of running a functional state.
However, the deployment of the regular force was easy only on paper; in reality, it was complicated by a number of unseen factors. The first serious challenge was the death of senior revolution leaders, among whom the death of the ZPRA commander and military genius Alfred Nikita Mangena was indescribably difficult to take.
One of the most crucial factors was the ZPRA leadership’s decision, taken just before the deployment of the regular force, to take the war to the Rhodesians. Before, guerilla warfare was mainly defensive, with operations limited to defending positions or picking targets where strategic interests of ZPRA or the liberation struggle in general were threatened/at stake. After this decision, ZPRA had to be on the offensive, the end desire being to push the Rhodesian Front into the defensive to force them to spread their resources.
This decision took the war into a different direction and directly resulted in the controversial downing of two Rhodesian civilian planes, one of which had been thought to be transporting Rhodesian Front military targets, including their dreaded commander, Peter Walls. These two incidents or the infamous downing of the Viscounts as they are historically known – and other serious incursions by ZPRA infuriated the Rhodesian government. From this point, ZPRA forces turned into public enemy number one for the Rhodesian Front and its regional and international supporters. The narrative of ZPRA and ZAPU as dreaded blended terrorists rather than freedom fighters solidified among this alliance of retrogressive forces.
However, as hinted in the first installment, the deployment of the regular army commenced undeterred by many developments that would have stopped a less determined force. The first Battalion, trained by the Zambian army in Mlungushi, was deployed in September 1978 in the Great East Road, Lusaka, Zambia. It was commanded by yours truly, Barbetone Muzwambira, a product of the officers’ training programme at Zambia Military Academy (ZMA), Kabwe. Other senior officers in this battalion were Sambulo, Richard Moyo, and Musonda. They were all trained products of the ZMA. After completing its initial tasks, this Battalion was posted to the Southern Front, which stretched from Plumtree to Mutare, south of the railway line.
The second battalion was sent to the Northern Front, which encompassed the Tsholotsho area, under the command of Smile Madubeko (aka Moyo). This battalion was armed to the teeth with all support arms, including anti-air guns, double barrels and the Sam 7 missile popularly known as the Strela to cover them.
The third battalion, commanded by Maj-General Stanford Khumalo, whose nom de guerre was Madliwa, was deployed at the Kariba Basin. This battalion also made history after it was accidentally discovered by the Rhodesian Air Force.
The Rhodesian Special Forces thought they had discovered a small base of a ZPRA company of guerillas, which they could dispel quickly. However, what was supposed to be a minor operation turned into one of the major battles of the entire war, which raged on for a full seven days, until the commander of the Rhodesian army ordered his forces to retreat. This battle is still celebrated in ZPRA and liberation folklore as an example of the tenacity of African liberation forces.
In March 1979, the Special Branch received Intelligence from its agents in Botswana that ZPRA vehicles purchased in South Africa were being transited through Botswana to Zambia. The information also indicated that two high-ranking ZIPRA officers would be transiting—Dumiso Dabengwa (the Dumiso Dabengwa) and Elliot Sibanda (known as Black Swine Mnyamana). On 29 March 1979, Selous Scouts dressed as ZPRAs laid an ambush along the highway in Northern Botswana. When the convoy approached the ‘kill zone’ the Scouts were unsure who would be in which of the several vehicles. A short contact deactivated some of the cars, and Black Swine was critically injured. A bullet had ripped his stomach open. The Black Russian was not found among the casualties and was assumed to have escaped. Black Swine was taken across the border to Rhodesia. He was flown to Salisbury and offered medical attention in exchange for vital Intel on ZPRA operations and plans. The special branch then interviewed him in the hospital while dangling the threat that they would remove the lifesaving apparatus, such as breathing and drips and let him die. He started singing to save his life.
Rhodesia was aware that ZPRA received support from the USSR and Cuban instructors, who were training them in conventional warfare for a potential invasion, an operation known as ZERO Hour. However, the specifics of the invasion plans remained unclear. The Special Branch and CIO were unable to uncover detailed information, but the capture of Black Swine helped fill in the intelligence gap.
It was now a do or die as they also learnt that ZPRA had tanks and Armoured cars which would soon be on their borders also included the Airforce that ZPRA was still preparing by training the pilots .
It was this information that put so much pressure on the Rhodesia government to truly end the war before they ran out of the country on defeat such as the Vietnam War.
