By Irvine Sibhona
Not much has been written or said about ZPRA’s urban warfare, which was launched in 1974. However, this was a strategically significant aspect of the liberation struggle against Rhodesian rule.
It also highlighted the distinct approaches to the war adopted by ZAPU’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) and ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). As is commonly known, like ZANLA, most of ZPRA’s operations were rural and guerrilla-based.
However, by the mid-1970s, the movement had developed a sophisticated urban strategy in which intelligence gathering and surveillance became increasingly prominent.
The urban strategy aimed to achieve two main objectives. First, it sought to sabotage Rhodesian strategic infrastructure, thereby crippling the enemy’s ability to supply its frontlines. Second, ZAPU recognised the need to complement ZPRA’s rural offensives in order to effectively prosecute the war. This was essential for stretching Rhodesian security forces thin.
Urban operations were not conducted in isolation from the broader liberation campaign; rather, they were coordinated with rural campaigns and designed to support them. These operations were not intended to occupy towns and cities but to disrupt critical economic infrastructure. The primary goal was intelligence gathering and sabotage in support of the liberation war. True to ZPRA’s disciplined military doctrine and ideological stance, civilian populations were not targeted.
ZPRA’s shift to urban operations followed the reorganisation of its intelligence units and the formation of the National Security Order (NSO). Infiltrating government-controlled urban spaces marked a significant milestone in Zimbabwe’s liberation war and further demonstrated ZPRA’s reach. Urban intelligence gathering in support of rural combat underscored a new military strategy that sought to balance intense rural operations with strategic infiltration of urban centres, the political, commercial, and industrial strongholds of Rhodesian power.
Over time, some operatives were transferred from ZPRA’s military intelligence unit to the party’s national branch. Ethan Dube led operations from Botswana until he was captured and killed by the Selous Scouts in 1974. After his death, the intelligence unit was renamed the NSO and placed under the leadership of Dumiso Dabengwa. Transfers from the military to the NSO continued.
In 1974, military intelligence expanded its scope, seeking more detailed information about the enemy. ZPRA began training operatives specifically for urban intelligence work. Figures such as Kembo Mohadi, Sekuru Mandu, and Moyana Ndebele were tasked with gathering intelligence in cities such as Salisbury and Bulawayo. Moyana remained in Zambia, later moved to Mozambique, and joined ZIPA. Mandu stayed in Salisbury, successfully avoiding detection during the politically sensitive period of prisoner releases. He later made his way to Mozambique, then returned to Zambia with valuable intelligence. Mandu played a key role in establishing routes for future ZPRA urban operations in Salisbury, using the Mozambique border, which had relatively lax surveillance.
Following the collapse of ZIPA in 1976, many guerrillas returned from Mozambique to familiar areas without receiving orders. Bulawayo, in particular, saw an influx of guerrillas who lacked assigned missions. This marked the beginning of intensified urban operations. These missions required strict discipline. Guerrillas had to avoid alcohol, women, and contact with relatives to evade detection. Many survived by following these rules, although some were compromised due to personal disputes.
The returning ZIPA group included both experienced and inexperienced fighters. The inexperienced cubs often entered cities using public transport, sometimes posing as students. Sibuko and John Nyampikidza, who trained in Morogoro, travelled this way to Bulawayo. Nyampikidza sought shelter with his brother, a police officer, who hid him. Other guerrillas, like Bhubhudla Khumalo, integrated into city life. Khumalo took a job with Pelandaba Bus Service and used his position to recruit others while travelling with an AK-47 beside him.
Urban recruitment eventually expanded to schools. Activists such as Vasco and George Chavunduka recruited students from institutions like Manama and Thekwane. These efforts aimed to provoke public reaction by demonstrating that even schoolchildren were joining the struggle. One such recruit was Lt General Emmanuel Matatu, who was taken by Vasco’s unit. This strategy echoed earlier actions by ZANLA, such as the abduction of students from St Albert’s Mission in 1973.
In 1976, a guerrilla was killed during a shootout with police in Luveve. Around the same time, ZPRA began developing new urban infiltration strategies based on lessons from earlier incursions into Salisbury and Bulawayo. Some guerrillas entered towns independently, without official orders, driven by personal initiative or defiance. One such individual was Albert Sumbo, who was captured in Bulawayo and taken to Victoria Falls to identify guerrilla routes and bases. He later escaped and returned to Zambia. His escape, widely reported by the Rhodesian media, alarmed the white population, who now feared that guerrillas were operating among them.
ZPRA urban operations soon escalated. The bombing of Woolworths in Harare was the first clear sign of their presence in the city. Subsequent arrests followed, and a sleeper cell was discovered. More guerrillas infiltrated the city. Msengezi, Zwimba, and Marshal Hartley became key staging areas for operations targeting Salisbury. After the 1978 attacks on Lusaka, it became easier to deploy guerrillas into Salisbury. However, the later centralisation of intelligence into a single national structure disrupted information flow. Much of the intelligence gathered earlier by operatives like Mandu had become outdated.
Sekuru Mandu was reassigned, and no new operatives were dispatched for urban intelligence missions. Nonetheless, urban guerrillas continued to play a vital role in the war effort. In 1977, a ZPRA commander suggested the writer join urban operations, but the offer was declined. Despite some setbacks, the missions unsettled the white population. Reports indicated that up to 250 white residents were leaving the country each month. ZPRA found Harare more accessible than Bulawayo.
Had military intelligence not been disrupted, urban operations could have achieved greater success. Many guerrillas entered towns without clear missions, and field commanders were often unaware of the activities of units passing through their areas, especially when missions failed. This confusion negatively affected morale. Still, urban operations proved effective. Even Rhodesian sources later admitted that ZPRA came close to bombing the Salisbury power station. This is cited by BSAP author George Selby in his memoir From Suit to Camouflage (2015, pp. 151–152).
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