By Mandlenkosi Mpofu

One of the most intriguing questions about Zimbabwe’s independence is why newly elected Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and senior leaders of his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union became so obsessed with making an enemy out of ZPRA, which had fought so gallantly for Zimbabwe’s independence. 

This question becomes more intriguing when contrasted with the length to which Mugabe and ZANU-PF went to accommodate former leaders of the Rhodesian Front government and their community.

However, much of the literature from the biographical works we have reviewed indicates that the main reason was ZANU-PF’s desire to establish a one-party state, and the fear – stemming from that desire – that ZAPU would resist that attempt and would use ZPRA, which was a formidable and well-armed machine in the early 1980s, as part of its resistance. ZANU-PF also desperately desired to be recognised as the only party that fought for the country’s independence through its armed wing, ZANLA, a narrative which was pushed aggressively through media spaces and other platforms.

Reading from David Coltart’s autobiographical book, The Struggle Continues, it is clear that ZPRA never had a place in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. The book offers glimpses of the rather grim plans in store for ZPRA soon after independence. The book also paints a picture of a ruling party which pushed the destruction of its imagined ZAPU and ZPRA enemies to the apex of the national agenda, to the extent of undermining the fragile peace soon after independence.

The ZANU-PF leadership led by the new commander of the national army, General Solomon Mujuru, insisted that ZANLA and ZPRA were not equal, the former was supposed to be the big brother in the new set up. Therefore, instead of building a unified army that would be part of an inclusive nation where everyone’s role was appreciated, Mujuru and his allies threw their weight around sometimes in openly provocative actions against former ZPRA commanders and fighters. The lack of responsible political leadership in ZANU-PF eventually led to the fierce battles that threatened the newly independent country.

Ironically, the hostility between the two erstwhile liberation movements became worse in the wake of the retirement of former Rhodesian army commander Peter Walls. Walls had managed to maintain a level of neutrality in the integration of the two armies, with the former Rhodesian army serving as a buffer that kept the two guerrilla armies from tearing each other.

After Walls departed, the leaders of the new national army led by Mujuru made the situation worse as they openly favoured ZANLA and literally mocked former ZPRA leaders and cadres through partisan decisions and actions. In fact, ZANU’s obsession with the destruction of ZPRA was sad in that as battles between former liberation movements intensified, members of the former Rhodesian army became the adults in the room.

As skirmishes between ZANLA and ZPRA threatened the fragile nation, former RF commanders such as including Lt-Col. Mick McKenna and Maj. Lionel Dyck took decisive action to prevent the conflict from escalating into full-scale, uncontrollable war. The two RF commanders even received accolades from the new government for ‘stabilising’ the situation after they successfully intercepted two columns of ZPRA infantry as they drove into Bulawayo during the battle of Entumbane.

However, accounts of the peacemaker role of the former RF commanders can unfortunately play down the equally important role played by former ZPRA leaders Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa to diffuse the conflict. Coltart highlights the immense sacrifices of the two leaders, who faced down ZPRA forces as they marched to Bulawayo and persuaded them to lay their arms down, at great risk to themselves. These actions are painful considering that the two former commanders became the main casualties of ZANU-PF’s onslaught on the ZAPU leadership. Masuku eventually died under state detention, after they both remained in incarceration despite successfully fighting concocted treason charges.

Unlike Masuku, Dabengwa and other leaders of ZAPU, prominent ZANU-PF leaders such as then Minister of Finance Enos Nkala openly stoked the conflict. The infamous Entumbane battle was not a random breakout of violence between the semi-demobilised guerrilla groups. It was indirectly instigated by the reckless speeches of ZANU-PF leaders. We could go farther and hazard that conflicts were deliberately stoked to create scapegoats for the planned crackdown on ZAPU and Matabeleland.

In vitriolic addresses to ZANU-PF rallies in Bulawayo just a few days before the battle broke out, Nkala openly insulted Nkomo and ZAPU, and threatened to unleash ‘ZANLA troops’ on these enemies of ZANU-PF. ‘Minority’ parties needed to be crushed in order to create a one-party state, Nkala charged with approval from other leaders of the government, who included Nathan Shamuyaria. The Entumbane battles erupted immediately after the second rally.

The actions of former ZANLA commanders therefore seemed to have the approval from belligerent leaders within the ruling party, most notably Nkala, and also Mugabe himself, whose unrestrained hostility towards ZAPU diffused down the ranksof his party.

In the first Heroes Day commemorations, on 11 August 1980, Mugabe denounced ‘malcontents’ whom he said were ‘unleashing a reign of terror’ in the country. Those who listened could have interpreted this as some kind of bravado by a newly elected leader who was still unsure about his own tenure so soon after the end of the volatile struggle for liberation. However, behind the scenes, more sinister steps were being taken whose outcome would be a full onslaught on unarmed ZPRA members, ZAPU leaders and the entire Ndebele-speaking populations of the Matabeleland provinces and parts of the Midlands provinces.

In October 1980, just two months after the Heroes Day rant, Zimbabwe signed a treaty with North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung, under which the North Koreans would train an army brigade which was to be used for ‘internal defence purposes’ in Zimbabwe. The Gukurahundi or 5th Brigade as it was to be infamously known, was already in incubation.

It is fair to argue that, out of fear or malice, Mugabe and his officials decided that ZPRA was a threat which needed to be neutralised through military means.

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1 Comment

  1. This is true, all our history books found in schools have nothing about Nkomo, ZAPU and ZPRA. History in our schools and elsewhere is not true history our liberation striggle.

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